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Abstract 
This paper recognizes vested interests as one of the primary premises that reduce the 
effectiveness of privatization policy, stall its momentum and produce structural problems in 
the long-run. Both exogenous and endogenous drawbacks are cited, but the main focus is put 
on the dynamism of vested interests’ character, their interconnectedness and evolution. Policy 
makers have been long aware of the existence of activities rooted in vested interests including 
empire building behaviors, creation of sinecures or extravagant management style. Hence, the 
fundamental effort here is put on the identification of emerging vested interests that were 
typically not considered by scholars. The channels through which conventional vested 
interests have snowballed over time are emphasized. This includes casting a closer glance at 
family employment, as well as at sports sponsorship arrangements, which emerge as the 
favorite domain of marketing activity for Polish state-owned enterprises. The research of 
available literature is performed, along with its application to the Polish case, and insightful 
observations concerning the anatomy of privatization-related reluctance. Rough policy 
recommendations conclude the paper. 
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Introduction 
The principal goal of the paper is to perform an in-depth investigation into the character 
of privatization-related vested interests that hamper the pace and depth of ownership 
transformation. The case of Poland is used as an example, both because of its familiarity to 
the author, and the presence of phenomena that are tackled in this paper, the pervasiveness of 
which may have been observed in Poland throughout the recent years. Vested interests were 
of course perceptible throughout consecutive stages of privatization in Poland from its very 
beginning, but the evidence here is designed rather to illustrate the contemporary struggle to 
overcome the residual resistance. The term „vested interests” embodies various political 
interests expressed by individuals or groups, deriving rents from a given state-owned entity 
and capable of forming pressure aimed at the preservation of status quo, which is favorable 
for them, but which puts taxpayers at a disadvantage. Another interesting frame for the notion 
of vested interests has been presented in Krusell & Rios-Rull (1996) who studied political 
obstacles to technological innovations. They depict this phenomenon by the incumbents 
blocking the emergence of novelties by influencing the regulatory process. 
There are undoubtedly some merits behind government’s presence in corporate world 
and the intention of this article is neither to analyze its legitimacy, accuracy and effectiveness, 
nor to argue in favor of privatization’s inherent value. In fact, as Hertog (2010) proved it for 
the Persian Gulf monarchies, it would be too bold to make an identity relationship between 
public ownership and ineffectiveness. It is equally troublesome to infer high-level 
consequences of too much state in the economy, given the plethora of intermediate variables, 
differences in initial conditions and adopted development models. It is also ambiguous what 
consequences political connectedness has for companies involved in political campaigns (see 
Newton & Uysal, 2013). 
 Hence, instead of seeking strict evidence for the ineffectiveness of state-owned 
enterprises (later referred to as SOEs), this paper rather relies on a generic, primitive 
assumption that private property in the broad economy is more effective than public property. 
The paper is solely to stress that there is a number of supplementary motivations that derail 
SOEs from their shareholder value-oriented regime and make policy makers not to cut the 
umbilical cord that feeds them with generous governmental perks. At the same time, being 
aware of the consequences of flawed state ownership is important as it attests to the 
importance of this article. First, vested interests and rent seeking behaviors can distort the 
economic efficiency of policy design and implementation in the domain of management of 
economic resources (Jamasb, 2006, p. 24). Second, they might have prolonged consequences 
for the level of development of the private sector and financial markets (Roland, 2001). Third, 
protracted privatization may have insidious influence on public finance, leading to its sub-
optimal structure and putting off necessary reforms. A certain sort of extra income 
dependency can be observed, meaning that the government takes yearly privatization revenue 
for granted, treating it as filling material for budget deficit (see e.g. Iimi, 2003). Henceforth, 
gradual and sluggish privatization postpones the need to introduce substantial, but openly 
disliked policy shifts. With swift privatization, government would be injected with a one-off 
cash boost, but in the coming years more courageous policies would have to be implemented. 
Rosa & Pérard (2010) stress that privatization-related literature is concentrated around 
two central subject matters: optimal privatization methods and efficiency gap between SOEs 
and private companies. Particularly, the ideological component that drives decision makers is 
unexploited. Although there is a broad literature also on the motivation of political actors to 
privatize or externalities associated with privatization, there is still a considerable deficit in 
comprehending the inhibitors to ownership transformation. Naturally, the political dimension 
is recognized and the political theory of privatization is developed in such papers as Boycko, 
Shleifer & Vishny (1996), Opper (2004) or Bortolotti & Pinotti (2008), but the existing 
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literature more often than not adopts a static stance towards interest groups, usually ignoring 
the fact their interests do evolve over time. 
On a statistical note, the history of privatization in Poland dates back to 1981 (the 
introduction of market socialism policy), but it is not before the collapse of communist regime 
in 1989 and pushing through a series of privatization bills until the property transformation 
gathered its momentum (for more extended recapitulation refer e.g. to Kowalik, 1991). 
Between 1990 and 2008, nearly 7,500 (85.4 percent as of 1990) state enterprises have been 
put under some form of privatization. However, this figure is remarkably deceiving, as more 
than every fifth enterprise was just “commercialized” into “sole-shareholder company of the 
State Treasury”, which is quite immaterial alteration as compared with the status of SOE. 
Moreover, about 1,000 firms from the (statistical) privatization pool were dissolved, while 
even more than that were handed over to a government-dependent entity, the Agricultural 
Property Agency. (see Central Statistical Office in Poland, 2009) 
Naturally, privatization in Poland is by far not a textbook example of perfectly failed 
policy. Tache (2008, pp. 12-14) enumerates such patterns, providing an example of her own 
country, Romania, as well as Russia, Bulgaria and Serbia, branding this model as a 
“patrimonial capitalism”. An extreme politcization of the underlying privatization schemes 
led virtually to a disappearance of hidden intrigues and charades, with vested interests being 
overtly displayed instead. For instance, members of the Romanian Parliament, sheltered by 
immunity, did not hesitate to perform managerial functions in the SOEs. In Poland, 
misconduct of such gravity has not been seen. To provide a complete picture, however, it is 
important to add that vested interests related to privatization do not necessarily ruin the whole 
market-oriented effort. For instance, as Rondinelli & Yurkiewicz (1996: 145) write, “the 
development of small- and medium-sized enterprises and the spread of entrepreneurial 
activity were far more important than privatization of state enterprises in moving Poland 
toward a market system”. Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions, such as Russia, the spoils 
system determined the quality of transition, and paralyzed market-oriented reforms (Moors, 
1997; Fischer & Sahay, 2000, p. 21), as “the state was easily captured by well-organized 
industrial interests” (Kapstein & Milanovic, 2000: 29). 
The paper is structured as follows. This introduction, containing the very brief outlook 
of privatization-related struggles in Poland, is followed by the discursive chapters on 
exogenous and endogenous sources of vested interests. The borderline between them happens 
to be blurred, but in general those exogenous originate outside the domain of policy makers, 
while the endogenous are rooted in politics. Afterwards, the dichotomy between conventional 
and emerging vested interests is presented, the latter being the phenomena that arose 
relatively recently and have not been so far extensively covered by scientific research. What 
comes next is the illustration of the emerging vested interests on the basis of a concise case 
study carried out with regard to the largest Polish SOEs. Policy recommendations and further 
research proposals are derived in the final chapter. 
The paper’s contribution to the literature comes in two forms. First, it firmly introduces 
vested interests as a dynamic phenomenon, whereas the past literature was at best agnostic 
about their nature, or portrayed them as a static occurrence. Second, the supportive value of 
this paper is that it offers a taxonomy of vested interests, not only dividing them into 
conventional vs. emerging, but also into exogenous vs. endogenous. The dynamics between 
these interconnected groups is also presented throughout the article. The conclusions may 
both enrich policy makers’ comprehension of vested interests domain, and assist in 
counteracting the overly improper use of political clout. 
As a rough introduction to the insights into exogenous and endogenous sources of 
privatization reluctance, one may review the following chart that should facilitate to keep up 
with the reasoning presented in this article. 
Figure 1. Exogenous and endogenous sources of privatization reluctance. 
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Exogenous determinants of sluggish privatization 
Although the intention of this paper is more to explore the endogenous dimension of 
privatization-related negligence, the brief recapitulation of exogenous factors is also desirable. 
As Bel & Fageda (2008, p. 6) write, “it is commonly assumed that public employees and 
unions are in favor of internal production, while industrial interests have a greater preference 
for privatization”. The privatization effort is indeed quite often impeded by the trade unions 
empowered by directly “touched” employees (Warner & Hebdon, 2001; Careja & 
Emmenegger, 2009). Privatization issues are thus still central to positioning strategies 
espoused by political parties in transition states. In aggregate, one should agree with Bortolotti 
& Faccio (2004, p. 2) remarking that there are few stories that document governments 
privatizing enthusiastically, and “most of the news stories depict governments that are faced 
with stiff opposition from many vested interests, but are forced to privatize because of 
budgetary shortfalls”. Hence, exogenous determinants of sluggish privatization are, at least by 
some scholars, seen as dominant and powerful. The table on the next page shows the selected 
data for state-owned entities in OECD economies in 2009. 
Based on the inputs presented in this table, the naïve correlations are as follows (figures 
in brackets indicate the correlation coefficient after excluding Norway, which is outstandingly 
peculiar with its sovereign wealth funds): 
 Employees as percent of population vs. GDP per capita: 0.043 (-0.342) 
 Market value as percent of GDP vs. GDP per capita: 0.372 (0.023) 
 Employees as percent of population vs. Corruption Perception Index: -0.053 (-
0.193) 
 Market value as percent of GDP vs. Corruption Perception Index: 0.180 (0.072) 
 Employees as percent of population vs. Index of Economic Freedom: -0.383 (-
0.431) 
 Market value as percent of GDP vs. Index of Economic Freedom: -0.167 (-
0.201) 
The caveats are particularly that correlation coefficients say nothing about causality and 
that it is a narrow and static approach, as the readily available data does not allow for full 
panel analysis. In fact, in order to advance to a more comprehensive picture, instead of having 
considered listed and non-listed enterprises, one should also include the statutory 
corporations, i.e. the units created by statutes. Although Christiansen (2011) has in fact done 
it, the OECD data set he uses has many non-negligible blanks. 
  
Table 1. Statistics of selected OECD member countries in 2009. 
 
Country 
GDP p.c. 
(PPP) 
000 USD 
Rankings 
Enterprises majority-owned by the central level of government Relative measures indicating the 
size of state-owned units Listed Non-listed Total 
CPI IoEF Units Employees 
Market 
value 
Units Employees 
Market 
value 
Units Employees 
Market 
value 
Employees as  
% of population 
Market value as 
% of GDP 
AUS 41.43 8.7 82.6 0 0 0.0 7 8 283 4.2 7 8 283 4.2 0.04% 0.47% 
AUT 39.26 7.9 71.2 2 28 741 8.2 6 50 459 7.8 8 79 200 16.0 0.95% 4.87% 
BEL 36.90 7.1 72.1 1 17 371 13.2 7 74 990 44.6 8 92 361 57.8 0.86% 14.51% 
CAN 38.63 8.7 80.5 0 0 0.0 33 105 296 21.6 33 105 296 21.6 0.31% 1.66% 
CHL 15.92 6.7 78.3 1 156 0.2 9 5 559 2.7 10 5 715 2.9 0.03% 1.08% 
CZE 25.88 4.9 69.4 1 33 000 25.3 82 38 200 9.9 83 71 200 35.2 0.68% 12.97% 
DNK 38.63 9.3 79.6 0 0 0.0 11 8 680 8.3 11 8 680 8.3 0.16% 3.89% 
EST 19.98 6.6 76.4 0 0 0.0 32 16 261 2.9 32 16 261 2.9 1.21% 10.85% 
FIN 35.87 8.9 74.5 3 24 844 29.4 28 61 187 16.3 31 86 031 45.7 1.61% 23.86% 
FRA 35.11 6.9 63.3 2 176 347 116.1 30 120 386 41.6 32 296 733 157.7 0.47% 7.17% 
DEU 35.96 8.0 70.5 0 0 0.0 57 66 419 22.9 57 66 419 22.9 0.08% 0.78% 
HUN 20.44 5.1 66.8 0 0 0.0 346 150 528 6.7 346 150 528 6.7 1.50% 3.27% 
ISR 27.71 6.1 67.6 0 0 0.0 29 50 264 43.2 29 50 264 43.2 0.67% 20.83% 
ITA 32.36 4.3 61.4 0 0 0.0 25 289 329 105.4 25 289 329 105.4 0.48% 5.38% 
KOR 26.22 5.5 68.1 8 39 599 38.3 48 81 056 139.4 56 120 655 177.7 0.24% 13.72% 
MEX 14.19 3.3 65.8 0 0 0.0 45 n/a 2.2 45 n/a 2.2 n/a 0.14% 
NLD 41.16 8.9 77.0 0 0 0.0 28 60 355 74.1 28 60 355 74.1 0.36% 10.84% 
NZL 29.87 9.4 82.0 1 10 726 0.5 17 17 107 9.1 18 27 833 9.6 0.64% 7.36% 
NOR 54.61 8.6 70.2 3 74 723 104.7 33 50 479 18.3 36 125 202 123.0 2.56% 46.06% 
POL 18.79 5.0 60.3 13 184 079 59.5 573 542 082 34.0 586 726 161 93.5 1.89% 12.92% 
PRT 25.27 5.8 64.9 0 0 0.0 42 81 465 16.6 42 81 465 16.6 0.77% 6.21% 
SVN 26.93 6.6 62.9 3 3 048 0.9 33 22 276 3.1 36 25 324 4.0 1.24% 7.25% 
ESP 32.15 6.1 70.1 0 0 0.0 115 106 963 36.3 115 106 963 36.3 0.23% 2.45% 
SWE 37.29 9.2 70.5 0 0 0.0 43 143 253 66.1 43 143 253 66.1 1.53% 18.90% 
CHE 46.81 9.0 79.4 1 19 813 19.8 1 7 534 0.7 2 27 347 20.5 0.35% 5.59% 
GBR 35.36 7.7 79.0 1 160 900 50.7 12 202 668 5.5 13 363 568 56.2 0.59% 2.59% 
Source: Christiansen, H. (2011) (data-related reservations outlined in this paper apply); Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2009; The 
Heritage Foundation & Wall Street Journal, www.heritage.org; OECD, www.stats.oecd.org. CPI stands for the Corruption Perception Index, while IoEF stands for the Index 
of Economic Freedom. 
Referring to the academic discussion, not everyone had incentives to make key 
industries free from the shackles of communist continuum back in the early nineties. Some, 
“shock therapists”, worried that if the privatization did not proceed quickly, the overwhelming 
pool of vested interests would stimulate a reversion to socialism. Others, “gradualists” were 
uneasy about hurried reforms, claiming “they would be a disaster – economic failures 
compounded by political corruption – opening up the way to a backlash” (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 
27). The main arguments of the big bang enthusiasts centered around two focal points: 
detaining asset stripping and precluding vested interest groups from blocking privatization 
later on (Fischer & Sahay, 2000, p. 12). Indeed, radical actions seem to be superior to gradual 
actions when it comes to tackling vested interests, since the latter allow “defenders of the 
status quo far greater latitude to sabotage reform” (Megginson & Netter, 1998, p. 29). The 
burden of vested interests tied to the ancien regime was also recognized by Earle & Gehlbach 
(2002, p. 5) who suggested a “strong state” as a firewall against this threat. Whereas in the 
nineties “shock therapists” received vast support provided by an empirical literature, they 
were finally challenged by “gradualists”, who have revisited the models and pointed out their 
substantial and methodological flaws. Overlooking initial conditions and institutional 
frameworks, and confusing the speed and the depth of reforms were the focus of critique 
(Campos & Coricelli, 2002, p. 51; Godoy & Stirlitz, 2006, p. 20). Even Sachs himself 
admitted afterwards that privatization policy prescriptions should contain less ideology, and 
be rather tailored to the country’s characteristics, since while ownership certainly matters, 
institutional infrastructure matters just as much (Zinnes, Eilat & Sachs, 2001, p. 166; 
Wallsten, 2002; Estrin et al., 2007, p. 37). 
The breakthrough periods are inseparably associated with extraordinary policies, 
initiated immediately as the country embarks on transition. First, “the magic of the moment” 
facilitates winning, at low or no cost, public consent for reforms. Second, it makes it easier to 
dismantle disorganized vested interests (Earle & Gehlbach, 2002, p. 6). However, much time 
has passed since Eastern European societies last had an occasion to take advantage of this 
approach, because the period of extraordinary policies has left for good. While at the very 
beginning of the transition road, the reformative enthusiasm and people’s approval of 
undergoing economic changes indeed provided an auspicious environment, it deteriorated 
quickly after the wrongdoings of privatization have been gradually made apparent. Members 
of nomenklatura, supposedly most proficient when it came to the comprehension of 
complicated legal framework, have engaged in “spontaneous privatization” right after new 
economic policies came into effect, and managed to strip “some assets of their firms through 
transfer pricing, sweet deals with foreigners, and other plundering devices” (Tirole, 1991, p. 
222). Pittance savings of the ordinary population precluded it to take its slice of the new 
shareholding structures. As spotted by Stiglitz (2002, p. 143), even if some would be eager to 
make use of their nest egg to take over an enterprise, they would probably not be able to 
restructure it, given galloping inflation and risk averse or infant financing providers. As 
domestic investment capabilities were scarce at the beginning of the nineties, the immense 
amounts of state-owned capital failed to attract broad masses. 
Clearly, following the years of communist propaganda according to which the state’s 
property belonged to people, it was problematic to make people satisfied as many of them felt 
empty-handed. Such an inference may be justified on the basis of Pentor’s survey about 
privatization sentiments (see chart below). Nevertheless, the research has been ceased after 
2004, yet before most recent and highly profitable initial public offerings (IPOs) of SOEs 
have been concluded (Megginson & Bortolotti, 2011), and further estimates are not available. 
Now it seems that a certain reluctance prevails if the vested interests of citizens are 
endangered rather than those of politicians. Therefore, ownership transformation is hampered 
in health care and utilities. Nevertheless, it is beyond discussion that privatization is a two-
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edged sword for the state authorities, and some modes of ownership transformation (e.g. 
Czechoslovakia’s voucher scheme, or – more up-to-date – Poland’s IPOs) may prove helpful 
in building up political capital and thus in increasing government’s popularity. Privatization 
of SOEs through the mass enfranchisement of employees may also contribute to mitigating 
the anti-privatization movement within the company (Shafik, 1996), but its track record in 
Central and Eastern Europe is not very impressive, presumably due to mentality issues 
(Castater, 2002, pp. 14-20; Kozarzewski, 2008, pp. 257-260). Moreover, the choice of a 
scheme is tricky as well. Whereas Czechoslovakian privatization was in fact a “give-away to 
outsiders” (glorious but inefficient), Russian case was rather a “give-away to insiders” 
(definitely inglorious) according to Roland’s (2000) typology. The search for a golden mean 
continues. 
 
Figure 2. A survey regularly carried out by Pentor until 2004, in which the question asked is: 
“Do you generally support the efforts aimed at privatization of the Polish economy?”. 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Treasury (2005, p. 279). 
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some extent reflected in the Polish corporate law. Radwan & Regucki (2012, pp. 17-18) 
present the articles of association of PGNiG (a SOE dealing with exploration and production 
of natural gas and crude oil) affirming that “the State may consent to the company taking 
actions or making investments that permanently or temporarily reduce the company’s 
economic efficiency, but are necessary for maintaining the energy security of the country”. 
This passage instructs that the state intervention is rationalized, as it is capable of endorsing 
social benefit at the cost of economic benefit of the corporation. The tensions between 
commercial and non-commercial nature of SOEs are more thoroughly explored by 
Christiansen (2013). In contrast, Raszewski (2012, pp. 130-131) warns that labeling 
something as a security issue (i.e. a strategically important matter) allows for dealing with 
such a problem “behind closed doors”. In fact, such a securitization becomes an extreme form 
of politicization. 
However, strategic status may be ascribed only to a fraction of SOEs (e.g. energy 
industry, petroleum industry, rail transport, aviation, shipbuilding, arms industry, coal mining 
industry), whereas still hundreds of enterprises remain de facto isolated from stimulating free 
market mechanisms. This “excuse” is amplified by another one. Many people are hesitant 
towards potential buyers, mainly foreign companies, which do not take into account Polish 
national interests. However, the argument of national interests is incomplete, as markets 
deemed strategic are usually strictly supervised by domestic regulatory bodies that restrain 
potentially abusive behaviors of foreign agents. Moreover, the dual role of state being both 
the owner and the regulator may give birth to conflicts of interest (Bauer, 2003). Also, the 
question of whether public authority makes shareholders better off, as compared with private 
management, remains highly controversial. An overpaid (2,34 bn USD for control stake) deal 
of PKN Orlen purchasing Lithuanian Mažeikiai refinery (Mažeikių Nafta) in 2006 would 
have probably never taken place if PKN Orlen had not been controlled by the State Treasury. 
The transaction was carried through due to political reasons, which was later confirmed by 
both Orlen’s executives and political leaders, but the refinery’s operations are significantly 
hampered by the anti-Polish activity of Russian oligarchs (Vitkus, 2009, pp. 31-33). 
On the borderline between exogenous and endogenous vested interests lies the 
ideological fragmentation of the political scene, i.e. the internal conflict of political elites, 
though existing as a consequence of inconclusive results of democratic elections. As 
Bortolotti & Pinotti (2008, p. 18) argue, greater political fragmentation (precisely: number of 
agents with veto power) is the factor entailing longer delays to implement large scale 
divestiture. The same is confirmed for economies considered developed, like Italy, where 
economic benefits from privatization have not been realized in full partly because of the 
“inherent weakness of the coalition governments that have run the country” (Goldstein & 
Nicoletti, 2003, p. 30). Needless to add, unstable political setting is highly likely to arise in 
transition states (Lipton & Sachs, 1990, pp. 298-299; Stark, 1990; Šikulová & Frank, 2013, p. 
30). Consequently, at the very beginning of the transition route, foreign investors are usually 
concerned about huge political risks. They not only risk low returns, but also, if unlucky, may 
have their assets seized by the next government, after being accused of, say, illegitimate 
privatization (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 144). Nevertheless, as Rattsø (2012) evidenced for Norway, 
political conflict there also raises the influence of interest groups around SOEs. The example 
of an abundant state struggling with the same shortcoming as transition economies adds up to 
the universality of this finding. On a related note, Imai (2009), who examined the 
privatization of Japan’s postal saving system, found robust evidence for incredibly complex 
legislative behavior with plethora of political factors involved and with conflicts not only 
between, but also within political parties. 
After more than twenty years of successful market economy in Poland, the existence of 
state-owned banks, power plants, refineries and coal mines, in addition to still considerable 
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amount of minority stakes, is difficult to apprehend. Since at the beginning of transition 
political agents may truly worry about layoffs and broadly understood social cost, these 
factors should diminish as time goes on (Agarwal & Nunnenkamp, 1992, p. 18; Godoy & 
Stirlitz, 2006, p. 18; Gupta, Ham & Svejnar, 2008, pp. 188-189). Overall, exogenous sources 
of vested interests typically lie behind the relatively idealistic interpretation of government 
inactivity in terms of ownership transformation of SOEs. As Megginson & Netter (1998, p. 7) 
put it, benevolent governments, in this optimistic view, act “in the (perceived) best interest of 
their citizenry” and are reluctant to resign from control fearing that the private sector would 
fail in providing necessary (strategically important) goods at an acceptable cost. Using less 
lofty language, the government simply takes exogenous vested interests for granted. The next 
chapter shows that the driving force of government’s procrastination may equally well lie 
elsewhere. 
 
Endogenous sources of privatization aversion 
Despite the unambiguously important influence of civic dissatisfaction, resistance or 
anxiety towards privatization, a deal of effort in this paper is aimed at exploring the supply-
side of privatization-related negligence. As we already know what societal convictions feed 
political agents and underpin their privatization aversion, let’s now investigate the 
endogenous factors that flourish solely within the political environment. This is along the 
lines of Olofsgård (2003, p. 11) who insists that “vested interest groups do not necessarily 
come from outside”, but the resistance to reform may be produced within the political elite. 
Anti-privatization vested interests’ sources are twofold.  
The first cradle constitutes nomenklatura being somehow in charge of given 
enterprise’s operations. They would oppose privatization as long as it takes in order to retain 
their own positions. Van de Walle (1989), who has not seen by then the post-communist 
privatization programs “in all their glory”, stated optimistically that political opposition to 
privatization is usually limited to the state bureaucracy. Although he also warned that this 
opposition may extend from corporate level to the level of ministry overseeing this 
corporation, he rather failed to predict that these were politicians and not the bureaucracy that 
took the lead in impeding privatization as time went on.  
Hence, the second source is even more sustainable and also more sophisticated. Implicit 
knowledge instructs that having an umbrella over public enterprises is a valuable fringe 
benefit for politicians capable of taking advantage of it. Either directly or indirectly, 
supervisory boards of such entities are nominated by the ones currently in power. This creates 
boundless opportunities of appointing one’s close associates and allies, possibly incompetent 
or not caring about the business. Decent wage, prestige and almost sure windfall severance 
package in case the political landscape changes, and the purge led by new government 
reshuffles the lineup of supervisory or management board members. Assuming it is not very 
unlikely that the enterprise’s corporate governance may be rotten to the core, identical 
mechanism is due to be replicated downwards throughout the organizational chart, 
magnifying the impact of a political steering wheel.  
This renowned mechanism, coined as “spoils system” (alternatively, “patronage 
system”), originated in the United States and reached its climax during Andrew Jackson’s 
presidency (1829-1837). However, it has not been eradicated until nowadays, neither in 
Poland (see e.g. Majcherkiewicz & Gadowska, 2005; Nowakowski, 2005; Gwiazda, 2008) 
nor in its cradle, the United States (see e.g. Lewis, 2009). Promises of positions in return for 
political support, e.g. during an electoral campaign, are not the only way to abuse one’s 
mandate. Politicians have in fact a broad portfolio of opportunities to endorse their proponents 
and temptations are all around, multiplied by prospective kickbacks in the form of pure cash 
or campaign contributions. Moreover, Dinç & Gupta (2011) found country-specific evidence 
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that no firm located in the state from which the Indian minister comes from (one who has 
jurisdiction over that firm), was ever privatized. As a matter of fact, Indian overly 
bureaucratic and discretionary system was enough to create vested interests that prevented 
reform in the past decades (Singh, 2010, p. 5). This result suggests that political patronage has 
a significant impact on the privatization decision. These mechanisms may be attenuated if 
politicians are restricted by the fear of private media coverage (Schoenman, 2005, pp. 50-51), 
but it materializes only provided that the abuse is evident and truly scandalous. The recent 
press coverage for Lubin, a headquarter of the state-owned giant KGHM, indicates that many 
local politicians sat in supervisory boards of KGHM or communal firms, although the 
remuneration taken from these firms has to be disclosed to the public, according to the 
domestic law (refer to Open Society Institute, 2002, pp. 418-419, for earlier instances of such 
misconducts). 
Politicians’ vested interests in Poland have been catalyzed for a long time via the  
“chimney bill” (limiting compensation for management in SOEs to six times the national 
average wage) that heavily curtailed top managers willingness to work for SOEs. According 
to DLA Piper, a global law firm, the bill of this kind was unprecedented in European Union 
(money.pl, 2008). Therefore, it is not surprising that comparative literature in this matter is 
inexistent. The bill was essentially a deterrent for top-notch specialists, and an open invitation 
to appoint less endowed executives. When the shortlist of contenders is unimpressive, it is 
relatively easy to pick pre-agreed candidates. As noted by Bohdan Wyżnikiewicz from the 
Gdansk Institute for Market Economics, the pathway to state-controlled management boards 
was open for young and inexperienced rookies, “almost-pensioners” or those attracted by 
political careers (RynekInfrastruktury.pl, 2012). The same finding, though indirect and 
deprived of detailed description, was revealed even by the Ministry of Treasury in Poland 
(2005, p. 124) in its annual report on privatization. The “chimney bill” was alleviated in 2010 
by Donald Tusk’s government, privatizing quite eagerly as compared with preceding cabinets, 
though still exhibiting symptoms of excess procrastination. According to media reports, the 
“chimney bill” is now virtually “dead”, with top SOEs, such as Polska Grupa Energetyczna 
(PGE), Enea, Tauron, Polish State Railways (PKP), Jastrzębska Spółka Węglowa (JSW) or 
Kompania Węglowa, bypassing the bill by making use of “managerial contracts”. 
A separate issue in the context of SOEs is the rotation of CEOs, implying the lack of 
long-term strategic stability. For instance, the current CEO of LOT Polish Airlines is number 
eight since 2005 (not counting the interim ones). Similarly, Państwowy Zakład Ubezpieczeń 
(PZU) had six CEOs between 2001 and 2007, and KGHM Polska Miedź (KGHM) had seven 
CEOs between 2001 and 2009. Whereas in a free market company, the management is 
preoccupied with profit maximization tasks, the management of a state-controlled entity, 
regardless of their will, is tied by motivations of political rather than economic nature. The 
managers of state-controlled enterprise are expected to maintain advantageous relationships 
with their benefactors, as numerous studies have validated the “importance” of managerial 
political connections (Faccio, 2010; Hillman, 2005; Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Wu & Cheng, 
2011). 
Bortolotti & Pinotti (2003, p. 9) remind that it has already been largely documented that 
SOEs are a source of political rent for elected politicians, “who can interfere in the operating 
activity of the company in order to cater specific interest groups”. Later on, they urge about 
most common modi operandi. These may include e.g. keeping redundant workers to push 
away the threat of unemployment and earn voters’ admiration. This is what Rosa & Pérard 
(2010, p. 112) would nickname as “interest-group realpolitik”, while Boycko, Shleifer & 
Vishny (1996, p. 310) argue that the spending politician may still be willing to subsidize a 
firm even after it is privatized, with the intent to “buy” excess labor spending. All of this 
despite the fact that employment rose and the working class was better off after privatization 
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(Galal et al., 1994; Megginson, Nash & van Randenborgh, 1994), contrary to anecdotal 
evidence. 
Bjørnskov & Potrafke (2011, p. 206) remark that vested interests more typically pertain 
to left-wing governments. By the same token, Li & Lui (2004, pp. 212-213) argue that right-
wing governments may have greater motivation in privatization or liquidation of SOEs, as this 
would weaken trade unions, their natural foe. In the light of the above mentioned arguments, 
Schindele’s (2003, p. 13) view, underlining a substantial role of politicians’ interest in the 
privatization process, seems to be an accurate synopsis: “being able to use the basic trade-off 
between the costs of restructuring the economy and efficient privatization, politicians might 
obtain private benefits from hindering privatization”. 
 
Conventional versus emerging vested interests 
Traditional sources of vested interests include the temptation to forego economic 
rationality in exchange for “empire building” behaviors. Most of these issues can be viewed 
as classical principal-agent problems (Vickers & Yarrow, 1989). In the context of non-
privatized company, this boils down to three particular situations: 
– “pumping up” the size of the company, e.g. through unnecessary investments or 
foreign expansion, which lacks economic rationale 
– the exploitation of sinecures, used to bolster one’s political influence 
– unnecessary, non-austere perks for the management, such as luxurious 
limousines, leather armchairs, but also the new headquarter. For instance, one of 
official Chinese reports, quoted by Cheng (2012, p. 359) indicates that “in a lot 
of loss-making SOEs, where workers could not receive wages, managers paid 
themselves full wages, bonuses, and subsidies, and rode around in luxury cars”. 
The vested interests that may be deemed new to this universe are the following: 
– creating additional channels of political influence and expanding the catalogue 
of incentives, with which politicians may please their networks (e.g. tolerating 
extravagant activity in the area of corporate social responsibility, sports 
sponsorship arrangements, lavish marketing expenses) 
– proactive family employment (nepotism), of substantial value in the age of 
turbulent market environment. 
Shleifer & Vishny (1994, p. 1024) argue that the privatization is most likely to occur 
when politicians cannot obtain large benefits from public firms any more. This is an 
apparently obvious axiom, but what the literature frequently omits is that political benefits, as 
shown above, may alter. For instance, once public opinion stops to accept politicians deriving 
a particular benefit from public firms, politicians might “invent” a new, less controversial 
genre of benefits. 
As it seems, the new vested interests display two traits. First, they are less unequivocal 
in terms of moral assessment, which means they are not unambiguously wrongdoings, at least 
at first glance. Such an inference is justified on the basis of a recent Public Opinion Research 
Center report (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, 2012), where nepotism was not 
unequivocally despised. Second, they generally account for more proactive role of the 
managers put in charge of the SOEs. In this view, manager’s (endowed’s) vision is not solely 
the derivative of the politician’s (endower’s) vision. It is more independent and 
individualistic. 
It is generally difficult to decide whether these two are more exogenous or endogenous 
vested interests. On the one hand, they are derivatives of the independence of SOEs’ 
management and as such, individuals in charge of SOEs are the main beneficiaries, enjoying 
prestige and respect. On the other hand, however, given complicated mutual relations and 
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reciprocation schemes between politicians and their nominees, politicians do also have 
incentives to maintain a pool of attractive job posts to fill. And these two additional benefits 
undoubtedly add up to the attractiveness of managerial positions in SOEs. 
 
Illustrations of the problem 
One of the most prevalent bonuses associated with not privatized enterprises is the 
relatively convenient opportunity to spend money for non-business activity, including sports 
team ownership or sports sponsorship schemes. By participating in these, politicians associate 
themselves with positive emotions, playing the role of the “sugar daddy”. In the communist 
era, economic flows activated not only by regular and full-fledged SOEs but also by state-
owned farms on the more local level, aimed at supporting sport constituted an obvious 
necessity given no alternative source of financing (Andreff, 2008, p. 23; Micek, Neo & 
Górecki, 2011, p. 48). Contrary to the United States, where the so-called sports industry is 
resilient enough to secure vast resources, in much part of Europe the idea of subsidized sport 
outlived the totalitarian regimes. Nevertheless, the public opinion is usually sensitive to the 
mismanagement of taxpayers’ money by a beneficiary sporting entity (Andreff, 2006, p. 9). 
 
Table 2. A summary of SOE-related sports sponsorship activities for key professional leagues 
in Poland. Note: names of companies were put in brackets only if they are not included in 
club’s official name. 
 
 Does SOE sponsors 
the league? 
Do SOEs sponsor particular clubs? 
Football Men No PGE GKS Bełchatów, Ruch Chorzów 
(Węglokoks), while KGHM Zagłębie Lubin is 
fully owned by SOE 
Basketball Men Yes (Tauron Basket 
Liga) 
Energa Czarni Słupsk, PGE Turów Zgorzelec, 
Polpharma Starogard Gdański (Tauron), 
Stelmet Zielona Góra (PGNiG, PKP 
Energetyka) 
Women No Energa Toruń 
Volleyball Men No PGE Skra Bełchatów, Jastrzębski Węgiel 
(JSW), LOTOS Trefl Gdańsk 
Women Yes (ORLEN Liga) Atom Trefl Sopot (PGE), Tauron MKS 
Dąbrowa Górnicza 
Handball Men Yes (PGNiG 
Superliga) 
Orlen Wisła Płock, Azoty Puławy, Tauron Stal 
Mielec 
Women Yes (PGNiG 
Superliga) 
KGHM Metraco Zagłębie Lubin, SPR Lublin 
(PGE) 
Source: proprietary analysis based on relevant corporate websites.  
 
It is not feasible to gather wide-ranging and accurate data on corporate involvement in 
sponsorship schemes. Even listed companies, although subject to rigorous discipline in terms 
of investor relations, do not have a duty to disclose such precise figures. This already should 
be a red flag for SOEs supervisors. Screening the yearly reports of twenty largest enterprises 
traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, reveals that whether firms share the details or not 
remains their discretionary choice. Nevertheless, Code of Best Practice for WSE Listed 
Companies (Warsaw Stock Exchange, 2011), updated 19 October 2011, says: 
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10. If a company supports different forms or artistic and cultural expression, sport 
activities, educational or scientific activities, and considers its activity in this area to be 
a part of its business mission and development strategy, impacting the innovativeness 
and competitiveness of the enterprise, it is good practice to publish, in a mode adopted 
by the company, the rules of its activity in this area. 
 
This rule should be applied not later than 1 January 2013. Based on yearly reports 
covering 2011, SOEs most often conceal their activity in this field. Such giants as Orlen, 
PGNiG or PGE, known for their active participation in sponsorship schemes, do not mention 
a word on it in their reports. 
 
Table 3. A summary of 2011 management reports issued by twenty largest companies on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange (WIG20 is a capitalization-weighted stock market index). 
 
No. Company Treasury 
stake 
(direct) 
Free float  
(mil PLN) 
WIG20 
share 
Nature of involvement in sports, 
according to the 2011 official 
yearly report 
1 KGHM 31.79% 26,395 15.086% 100% ownership in Zagłębie 
Lubin S.A., management of 
football section, organisation of 
professional sporting events, 
enlisted as part of CSR 
2 PKOBP 33.39% 24,036 13.738% Mentions several running events 
that the bank supported 
3 PZU 35.1875% 23,674 13.531% None 
4 PEKAO - 17,960 10.265% None 
5 PKNORLEN 27.52% 15,903 9.089% None 
6 PGE 61.89% 13,654 7.804% None 
7 PGNIG 73.50% 8,596 4.913% None 
8 TPSA - 8,092 4.625% None 
9 TAURONPE 30.06% 5,145 2.940% None 
10 BOGDANKA - 4,587 2.622% Admits that there is a separate 
advertising budget dedicated to 
sports sponsorship (7,932,500 
PLN), along with the very broad 
clarification of why the sports 
sponsorship is important to the 
firm. The report enumerates 
clubs that have been supported. 
11 BRE - 4,162 2.378% None 
12 JSW 55.16% 3,612 2.064% None 
13 HANDLOWY - 3,247 1.856% None 
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14 KERNEL - 3,231 1.847% None 
15 ASSECOPOL - 3,167 1.810% Mentions sponsorship 
agreements with Asseco 
Prokom Gdynia (agreement set 
to expire on 31 July 2015) and 
Asseco Resovia (until 31 May 
2014). 
16 SYNTHOS - 2,742 1.567% None 
17 LOTOS 53.18% 2,468 1.411% None 
18 GTC - 2,153 1.230% None 
19 TVN - 1,568 0.896% None 
20 BORYSZEW - 572 0.327% None 
Source: www.stooq.pl [accessed: 5 January 2013]; applicable corporate reports. 
 
Although sports sponsorship has been incorporated into the corporate marketing 
function well ago (see Farrelly, Quester & Burton, 1997), there are doubts on whether the 
scope of support is not too lavish in the case of SOEs. There are also numerous examples of 
municipal firms, or municipalities directly, that sponsor professional sports. However, 
although controversial, this model does not lead to a geographical discrimination. Supporting 
the local team from local taxes may be considered as part of municipality’s strategy to attract 
new inhabitants to the town or to provide them with entertainment. On the contrary, 
countrywide SOEs, if they invest locally, discriminate other locations, which are deprived of 
their own sports team. Cherry-picking local teams to support at the cost of other regions 
seems to be a breach of neutrality. Since corporations back professional teams more 
enthusiastically than amateur sports and physical activity in general, the underlying moral 
case to be tackled is even more pronounced. 
Another problem associated with SOE-related vested interests is family employment. 
This not only concerns big nationwide corporations where such schemes are difficult to 
detect, but particularly the small-scale municipally-owned entities. Such a category usually 
comprises bus operators, waterworks companies, provision of public utilities, road 
maintenance or city cleaning services. In August 2012, “Rzeczpospolita” disclosed that 40 
percent of Warsaw City Council members work for various governmental or self-
governmental bodies. Overall, Polish mayors and heads of counties employ 250,000 people, 
whereas the central administration hires 180,000. In the age of unemployment and bleak 
economic prospects, the ability to create jobs and hand-pick employees adds up much to the 
prestige of an official, who may derive rents and expect for reciprocation from the ones 
employed. It is not uncommon for the local governor to be a leading employer in a commune 
or in a county. 
Sixteen voivodeship capitals operate 280 municipally-owned entities (including 44 in 
Warsaw only). Municipally-owned firms are attractive to territorial governments, since in 
many cases they allow for hiding debt. Since Poland’s constitution caps debt to a pre-
determined threshold, territorial governments have limited options for boosting their 
expenditures and thus municipally-owned entities become helpful in deceiving their true 
financial condition. In general, the privatization at the local level is a separate issue, with 
different set of incentives and disincentives. The level of complexity varies and while some 
scholars have found evidence that fiscal constraints, political and ideological considerations 
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are decisive determinants of privatization policy (Bel & Fageda, 2009, p. 116), others rather 
point out pragmatic concerns such as service quality (Warner & Hebdon, 2001).  
A scandal that broke out in 2012 around the Agency for Restructuring and 
Modernisation of Agriculture (ARiMR) is edifying. As it became clear for the public, the 
agency, whose task is particularly to transfer the EU agriculture funds to Polish beneficiaries, 
has numerous staff. Apart from the headquarter with 25 departments and 16 regional offices, 
there are 314 local offices. It gives over 10,000 employees in total and a considerable 
potential for sinecure creation. Simultaneosuly, the Agricultural Market Agency (ARR), with 
tasks partially overlapping with ARiMR, hires 1,200 people and – to make the picture full – 
there are additional 1,000 jobs in the already mentioned Agricultural Property Agency. 
Some theoretical explanation of the phenomenon of nepotism in SOEs is offered by 
Santalainen, Baliga & Leimann (2003, pp. 78-79), who underline that the need to adjust to the 
free market standards inevitably leads to the disruption of prevailing corporate norms and 
values, part of which is providing employment to friends and relatives. They also highlight 
the excess employment that typically prevails in SOEs, and wrote about the problem of 
altered “psychological contract” that invades safety of employees and gives rise to their 
disappointment. Gabris & Simo (1995) tried to discern whether the career motivations of 
public sector employees and private sector employees are contradictory, which would 
partially explain the perplexity of SOE’s employees when faced with privatization plans, but 
they did not arrive at any convincing results. 
Having said that, we may conclude that SOEs have become full-grown extension of the 
regular public authority. State-owned business units serve no more solely to protect country’s 
economic interest. The abovementioned case studies illustrate the multidimensional expansion 
of vested interests that indicates that they flourish rather than fall into decline. 
Precisely, the corollary from screening these several cases is that the magnitude of the 
phenomenon is considerable and the innovation in inventing and exploiting the new sources 
of vested interests fell into a habit of the Polish government, territorial governments and 
SOEs. Whereas the public opinion has already learnt how to blow the whistle to condemn the 
SOEs’ behavior when conventional vested interests are manifested (which is not to say that 
these conventional sources are on decline), it still does not have tools, or will, to face the new 
wave of spoils. The delicateness of sports sponsorship, CSR or nepotism is evident. 
Criticizing the sponsorship of “glorious” goals may sometimes fail to attract many admirers. 
Criticizing nepotism must make anybody think twice, whether the claimant herself and her 
closest relatives are above suspicion. In the interconnected world of politics and bureaucracy, 
the sinlessness is in deficit. 
 
Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper recognizes vested interests as one of the primary premises that reduce the 
effectiveness of privatization policy, stall its momentum and produce structural problems in 
the long-run. Since empire building behaviors, creation of sinecures or extravagant 
management style have all been identified by scholars long ago, this paper strives to unravel 
more up-to-date, emerging and yet unexploited sources of vested interests. The channels 
through which conventional vested interests have snowballed over time are briefly described. 
Among this new set of privatization constraints, a closer look is cast at employing relatives 
and engaging in lavish sports sponsorship arrangements. The latter appears to be the favorite 
domain of marketing activity for Polish SOEs. 
Policy recommendations provided by the literature as regards the solution of the 
underlying deficiency read as follows. Alesina & Tabellini (2004, p. 23) urge that if vested 
interests are in place, it is more efficient to let a non-elective bureaucrat handle a given 
problem than to have it retained by a politician, inherently vulnerable for voters’ rage. Similar 
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argument emerges from the inferences of Earle & Gehlbach (2002, p. 5), as the absence of an 
established reform-oriented constituency is likely to produce a backlash when the inevitable 
privatization-related short-term costs occur. To mitigate the risk of premature policy reversal, 
some kind of “insulation” of the polity from the public may be considered. Moreover, 
Bortolotti & Pinotti (2003, p. 9) seem to have found that the electoral system is important: the 
ones with plurality systems perform better and politicians are less likely to pursue rent 
seeking behaviors, as compared with the system based on proportional representation. 
Schindele (2003, p. 13) puts forward a solution, too: bargaining models of privatization 
suggest that “in order to achieve efficient privatization, corruption should be impossible and 
firms should face hard budget constraints”, which necessitates the full coverage of costs with 
revenues. In fact, neither of these conditions has ever been met in full in Poland. Though, the 
issue of implementation of any guidelines in the underlying matter remains difficult, due to 
the self-policing problem (nemo iudex in causa sua). 
As far as the conclusions stemming directly from this paper are concerned, two policy 
recommendations seem justified. First, given no rapid privatization, the remuneration schemes 
in public enterprises call for amendment. The pattern of the compensation should be 
benchmarked to the market, reflecting the significance of the function, as well as ensure the 
appropriate level of motivation for the manager. The current “chimney bill”, approved in 2000 
under the populist pressure, is by no means the replication of the stimulating free market 
remuneration plans. Naturally, this will exert a tangible impact on the minimization of interest 
group influence only if it suffices to attract top-notch independent managers to SOE, and if it 
is accompanied by a fair and unbiased manager selection process. Second, the multilateral 
improvement in transparency should be demanded. This may capture both the overt and 
detailed information of all marketing arrangements that SOEs take up (what has been partly 
stipulated by the already mentioned Code of Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies), as 
well as the disclosure of all relevant conflicts of interest that decision makers might have. As 
soon as such conflicts arise, a politician or a bureaucrat should be advised to dissociate from 
the decision making, since the quoted examples from India or Japan proved that the 
detachment of reason and the subordination to pressure group interests are quite common 
when vested interests come into play. The antidote for the expanding set of vested interests 
lies obviously also in the ethical conduct of the ones in power, high standard of which being 
always deficient in transition economies. This, however, is the starting point for a completely 
different study. 
There are several directions in which further investigation into the roots of vested 
interests should proceed. First, the paramount challenge is measurement. The quantitative 
tools are of limited value due to the poor data sets, data opacity and problematic sampling. 
Methods of how to navigate this paucity need to be improved. Second, the issue of 
universality seems interesting. Since this paper tries to display the Polish pattern of petrifying 
vested interest, it does not aspire to be considered ubiquitous. Third, the actual strength and 
durability of vested interests in the various stages of privatization processes is interesting. 
With regard to the last proposal, two hypotheses may be crafted to stimulate future research. 
One, vested interest have limited impact on the very beginning of transformation, when 
reformist enthusiasm is bigger. Two, the nature of vested interests changes over time and new 
ones crowd out the older ones, what was partially argued in this paper. 
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